Missouri Law Review
Volume 83

Issue 3

Article 8

Summer 2018

American Greed: The Eleventh Circuit Analyzes Whether Booze,
Babes, and Business Can Tightrope the Line Between Fraud and
Deceit
Raymond Lee

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Raymond Lee, American Greed: The Eleventh Circuit Analyzes Whether Booze, Babes, and Business Can
Tightrope the Line Between Fraud and Deceit, 83 MO. L. REV. (2018)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol83/iss3/8

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
bassettcw@missouri.edu.

Lee: American Greed: The Eleventh Circuit Analyzes Whether Booze, Babe

NOTE
American Greed: The Eleventh Circuit
Analyzes Whether Booze, Babes, and
Business Can Tightrope the Line Between
Fraud and Deceit
United States v. Takhalov, 827 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir.), as revised (Oct. 3),
modified on denial of reh’g, 838 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir. 2016)

Raymond Lee*

I. INTRODUCTION
South Beach, Miami, is renowned for its beautiful beaches, bikini-clad
women, and incredible wealth.1 Such an environment is ripe for opportunistic
businessmen who are anxious to make an easy buck. Enter Albert Takhalov,
Isaac Feldman, and Stanislav Pavlenko (the “Defendants”), three Russian immigrants who built a business model aimed precisely at taking advantage of the
unique opportunities that South Beach has to offer.2 By combining seductive
women with tourism and alcohol, their profits quickly began to soar.3 There
was only one problem. The crux of their plan involved misleading their patrons. While schemes to profit from unsuspecting customers are hardly a modern concept, at what point does merely deceiving a customer become “taking
advantage” of him? And at what point can a legitimate business model morph
into a fraudulent criminal enterprise? The gray area in the middle is where the
law tends to get murky.
Fraud itself is not defined anywhere in the federal criminal code.4 As
courts across the country – both state and federal – have helpfully observed,
*

B.S., Hannibal-LaGrange University; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School
of Law, 2019; Senior Associate Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2018–2019.
1. See Michelle S. Viegas, Community Development and the South Beach Success Story, 12 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 389, 392–93 (2005) (“Miami has earned its
renown . . . from its . . . celebrity-frequented hotels and beaches . . . . This area’s mobile
and diverse population of . . . independently wealthy entrepreneurs, models and tourists
contributes to an eclectic atmosphere unlike any other in the United States.”).
2. See Brief for the United States at 6–7, United States v. Takhalov, 827 F.3d
1307 (11th Cir.), as revised (Oct. 3), modified on denial of reh’g, 838 F.3d 1168 (11th
Cir. 2016), (No. 13–12385–CC), 2014 WL 6844552, *7–12.
3. See id. at 13–15.
4. See Fraud and False Statements, 18 U.S.C. ch. 47 (2012); see also Lawrence
Bader, Trying to Define ‘Fraud’ Under Federal Criminal Law, FORBES (Oct. 19, 2011,
9:56 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2011/10/19/trying-to-define-fraud-
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“The law does not define fraud; it needs no definition. It is as old as falsehood
and as versatile as human ingenuity.”5 But this lack of definition means that
the distinction between being defrauded and merely being deceived still presents itself in cases today. In the summer of 2016, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit addressed the shortcomings of fraud in United States
v. Takhalov.6
Takhalov is a case about booze, babes, and business practices that could
easily be called deceptive.7 Wealthy Miami tourists were effectively tricked
into spending exorbitant sums of money on drinks and caviar in an effort to
entertain attractive women whom they believed to be friendly fellow tourists,
but were, in reality, employees of bars.8 The case raises the question of whether
all deceit is fraud or whether there is a level at which insidious entrepreneurs
can mislead customers without violating federal statutes that prohibit fraudulent practices.9
This Note analyzes the facts and holdings of Takhalov and then delves
into the history of statutes that prohibit employees from drinking and/or mingling with patrons, as well as the history of wire fraud. Next, it discusses the
importance of not abusing the wire fraud statute so as to maintain a fine line
between fraud and deceit. Lastly, this Note contends that the prosecution overstepped its bounds by bringing charges pursuant to the wrong criminal statute
and that the correct statute, under which the prosecution should have brought
charges, needs to carry tougher penalties.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The Defendants collectively owned and operated a group of bars and
nightclubs in South Beach, the most prominent of which was known as Caviar
Bar.10 Early in 2010, the Defendants constructed a plan to capitalize on Miami
tourism.11 They hired a number of young, attractive women, many of whom

under-federal-criminal-law/#4608a7001527 (“Interestingly, the word fraud is not defined under [the federal criminal] statutes.”).
5. State v. Shaw, 847 S.W.2d 768, 775 (Mo. 1993) (en banc) (quoting United
States v. Bishop, 825 F.2d 1278, 1280 (8th Cir. 1987)).
6. 827 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir.), as revised (Oct. 3), modified on denial of reh’g, 838
F.3d 1168 (11th Cir. 2016).
7. Id.
8. Id.; Brief for the United States, supra note 2, at 20.
9. Id.
10. Brief for the United States, supra note 2, at 6–12.
11. Id. at 8–9.
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were foreign, known as “B-girls”12 to help attract business.13 The B-girls
would work in pairs, scouring local hotels in search of available men.14 In
particular, they would look for “telltale signs of wealth, such as expensive
watches or shoes.”15 Once they found their marks, they would approach the
men and pose as wholesome tourists in search of company.16 The women
would then proceed to get the men as drunk as possible with the ultimate goal
of enticing them to go to Caviar Bar (or one of the Defendants’ other clubs) in
mind.17 The men, spurred along by hard drinking and casual conversation and
totally unaware of the arrangement between the women and the bar, were often
happy to oblige.18
At the Defendants’ club, the plan would come full circle. At the encouragement of the B-girls, targets invariably bought bottles of expensive champagne, rounds of excessively priced drinks, and heaps of fine Beluga caviar.19
As the night continued, the number of drinks the men consumed would accumulate, which would cause their recollection of the evening to blur as their bar
tabs began to soar.20 In total, an estimated ninety men were enticed out of more

12. A “B-girl” is “a woman employed by a bar, nightclub or the like, to act as a
companion to male customers and to induce them to buy drinks, and usually paid a
percentage of what the customers spend.” Amanda H. Littauer, The B-Girl Evil: Bureaucracy, Sexuality, and the Menace of Barroom Vice in Postwar California, 12 J.
HIST. SEXUALITY 171, 174 (2003). The concept of “B-girls” and bars employing
women to encourage men to purchase drinks goes back generations. See, e.g., United
States v. Amadio, 215 F.2d 605, 609–10 (7th Cir.), rev’d, 348 U.S. 892 (1954) (“Almost all of the taverns and night clubs had ‘B girls’ . . . engaged in soliciting drinks
from men customers.”); People v. Burnette, 102 P.2d 799, 805 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1940).
13. Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1310.
14. Jay Weaver, Federal Trial of Miami Beach Club Operators Linked to Russian
Mob Gets Underway, MIAMI HERALD (Oct. 10, 2012, 8:37 AM), http://www.miamiherald.com/latest-news/article1943427.html.
15. Id.
16. See Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1310.
17. Brief for the United States, supra note 2, at 13–14.
18. Id. at 14, 40.
19. See id. at 14–15; see also Nina Golgowski, The Miami Honeytrap,
DAILYMAIL.COM (Nov. 5, 2012), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article2227974/Alec-Simchuk-Russian-mobster-Miami-bar-girls-trial-reveals-1M-scamEastern-European-women.html. According to the government, club employees would
stop at nothing to keep the tab accruing, including providing shots of liquor that were
kept behind the counter to “impair” the men further, ordering bottles for the victims,
and possibly drugging the men. Brief for the United States, supra note 2, at 15.
“[E]mployees would pour vodka in the men’s beer to get them drunker, misrepresent
the prices of drinks, hide menus, cover up prices, and even forge the men’s signatures
on credit-card receipts.” Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1310.
20. See Brief for the United States, supra note 2, at 14.
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than $1,300,000 at the encouragement of the B-girls.21 The most prominent
victim, a former on-air meteorologist from Philadelphia, was influenced out of
$43,000 over a two-night period.22
The government viewed the Defendants’ business enterprise as criminal,
claiming the whole operation was nothing more than an unlawful scheme built
on a series of lies.23 In its view, the lies began the moment the girls first introduced themselves to the men24 and ended with unsuspecting tourists blackout
drunk, several thousand dollars poorer, or, in many cases, both.25 Thus, in an
effort to bring the scheme to a halt, a grand jury indicted the Defendants on a
combined total of ninety-eight separate charges, including eighty-five counts
of wire fraud,26 four counts of conspiracy to commit wire fraud,27 four counts
of conspiracy to commit money laundering,28 four counts of visa fraud,29 and
one count of bribery.30
The government argued that the jury could have convicted the Defendants
of fraud based simply on the lies the women told the men to lure them into the
bar in the first place, regardless of what happened after the men got there.31
Had the men known the women were actually club employees rather than
friendly strangers, they would not have entered the club.32 In the government’s

21. See id. at 79 (finding Pavlenko was responsible for $273,897 in loss; Feldman
was responsible for $334,040 in loss; and Takhalov was responsible for $719,219 in
loss); Weaver, supra note 14.
22. Brief for the United States, supra note 2, at 26–27; see also Weaver, supra
note 14.
23. See Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1310.
24. The women had incentive to initiate contact, as the typical arrangement was
that each B-girl received a twenty percent commission for bringing in customers.
Weaver, supra note 14.
25. Brief for the United States, supra note 2, at 26–29.
26. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012). The wire fraud statute allows for a charge to be
brought for each individual occurrence of fraud and does not require that each occurrence be grouped together in one charge. See United States v. Castillo, 829 F.2d 1194,
1199 (1st Cir. 1987).
27. 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (2012).
28. Id. § 1956(h) (2012).
29. Id. § 1546 (2012).
30. Id. § 201; Brief for the United States, supra note 2, at 2–3. Pavlenko and
Feldman were each charged with one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, twentysix counts of substantive wire fraud, one count of conspiracy to defraud the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (visa fraud), and one count of conspiracy to commit
money laundering. Id. at 2. Takhalov was charged with two counts of conspiracy to
commit wire fraud, thirty-three counts of substantive wire fraud, two counts of conspiracy to defraud the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (visa fraud), two counts of
conspiracy to commit money laundering, and one count of bribery. Id. at 2–3.
31. United States v. Takhalov, 827 F.3d 1307, 1311 (11th Cir.), as revised (Oct.
3), modified on denial of reh’g, 838 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir. 2016).
32. Id.
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view, any business conducted in the bar took place under false pretenses and
amounted to fraud.33
The Defendants’ story differed. During the trial, the Defendants freely
admitted that they had tricked men into entering their clubs, but they did not
believe that what they were doing was illegal.34 Instead, the Defendants contended that they believed the scheme was “a perfectly legitimate business
model.”35 They argued that if all the government could prove was that the men
were tricked into entering the bar, then the men were merely deceived but not
defrauded.36 Although the women might have concealed their relationship
with the club, once inside the club, the men ordered bottles of alcohol, drank
them with their female companions, and were charged a price that they agreed
to pay.37 Thus, in the Defendants’ view, none of the men were truly “victims.”38 Instead, they simply “got what they paid for – nothing more, nothing
less.”39
With that strategy in mind, and fearful that the jury might convict them
of wire fraud based solely on their deceptive arrangement with the B-girls, the
Defendants asked the trial court to instruct the jurors “that they must acquit if
they found that the defendants had tricked the victims into entering a transaction but nevertheless gave the victims exactly what they asked for and charged
them exactly what they agreed to pay.”40 The trial court, believing that to be a
misstatement of the law, did not allow the instruction.41
Ultimately, a jury from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of Florida convicted the Defendants on only twenty of the ninety-eight combined counts.42 However, those twenty counts were enough to result in the
Defendants being sentenced to a sum total of more than thirty years imprisonment and being ordered to pay over $90,000 in restitution.43
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See id.
Id. at 1310–11.
Id. at 1310.
Id. at 1311.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1310.
Id. at 1311.
Brief for the United States, supra note 2, at 3–4. Pavlenko was convicted of
ten counts total, including one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, eight counts
of substantive wire fraud, and one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering.
Id. at 3. Feldman was convicted of one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and
one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering. Id. at 3–4. Takhalov was convicted of eight total counts, consisting of two counts of conspiracy to commit wire
fraud, three counts of substantive wire fraud, two counts of conspiracy to commit
money laundering, and one count of visa fraud. Id. at 4.
43. Id. at 3–6. Pavlenko received a seventy-eight-month (six-and-a-half-year)
sentence with three years of supervised release and was ordered to pay $6,491.60 in
restitution. Id. at 5. Feldman received a 100-month (eight-and-a-third-year) sentence
with three years of supervised release and was ordered to pay $15,498 in restitution.
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On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed
and remanded all but a single visa fraud conviction, holding that the trial court
abused its judicial discretion in refusing to give an instruction that could have
possibly led the jury to reach a different verdict.44

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. B-Girl Statutes
Hiring girls to encourage men to spend money is a concept that has been
around for ages. In America, the earliest evidence of this opportunistic behavior can be traced back at least as far as the 1850s.45 During that period, women
followed men out West, as both were anxious to capitalize on the gold rush.46
Although ploys such as the “B-girl racket” were forced into a temporary hiatus
during prohibition, they bounced back quickly, and taverns regularly employed
saloon waitresses “whose constant pleas of ‘just one more little drink’ cost
many a customer his shirt.”47 These schemes flourished by the middle of the
twentieth century “when hundreds of bars and night clubs [across the country]
maintained salaried staffs of B-girls, who kept customers company at the bar
and matched them drink-for-drink – in colored water, tea or soda pop, but at
whiskey prices.”48
Legislators began to take note of the sheer amount of money being taken
in by this “less than wholesome” industry, and, in an effort to eliminate these
types of enticements, states began passing laws to prohibit them.49 The reasons
ascribed to these kinds of regulations were many. Among them were to avoid
Id. Takhalov received a 204-month (seventeen year) sentence with three years of supervised release and was ordered to pay $68,757.57 in restitution. Id. at 5–6.
44. Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1324–25.
45. See Littauer, supra note 12, at 174.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 174–75 (“B-girls reappeared after Prohibition and became standard features of popular . . . bars during the Depression, wartime, and postwar years.”); see BGirls Fading Attraction in Bars Throughout U.S., SCHENECTADY GAZETTE (Dec. 27,
1954), http://fultonhistory.com/newspaper%208/Schenectady%20NY%20Gazette/Schenectady%20NY%20Gazette%201954%20Grayscale/Sc
henectady%20NY%20Gazette%201954%20Grayscale%20-%209570.pdf.
48. SCHENECTADY GAZETTE, supra note 47. B-girls have also appeared in popular
culture. For example, Marilyn Monroe famously portrayed a B-girl in Bus Stop (1956).
See Littauer, supra note 12, at 195. In the film, Monroe’s character, Sherrie, consumes
four tea-and-sodas before her companion catches on and confronts her. Id. at 195–96
n.81. Monroe was nominated for a Golden Globe for her portrayal. Winners & Nominees: Marilyn Monroe, GOLDEN GLOBES, https://www.goldenglobes.com/person/marilyn-monroe (last visited Aug. 26, 2018).
49. See J. E. Leonarz, Annotation, Regulations Forbidding Employees or Entertainers from Drinking or Mingling with Patrons, or Soliciting Drinks from Them, 99
A.L.R.2d 1216, § 1[a] (1965) (updated weekly).
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a deliberate commercial exploitation of the customer;50 to curtail personal contact between female employees and nightclub patrons;51 to avoid the danger to
the public that bars might be converted from their proper use as places of sociable and relaxed drinking into places for solicitation of customers;52 to prevent the evils resulting from encouraging customers to spend more money and
drink more alcohol than they otherwise would;53 and to eliminate the occupation of B-girls entirely – “a practice said to have done more to bring criticism
upon the liquor industry than anything else.”54
While most states do not have a statute designed to prohibit arrangements
in which bars hire women for the sole purpose of boosting business, Florida is
one of the few states that does.55 Enacted in 1961, Florida Statutes section
562.131 makes it unlawful for any employee56 or agent of an establishment that
possesses a liquor license to “beg or solicit any patron or customer” of that
establishment to buy them a drink.57 Further, it is unlawful for any establishment possessing a liquor license to knowingly permit any person in or around
the premises “for the purpose of begging or soliciting any patron or customer”
to buy drinks.58 Florida has made violation of section 562.131 a second-degree
misdemeanor59 punishable by a maximum term of sixty days imprisonment and
not more than $500 in fines.60

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Greenblatt v. Martin, 2 Cal. Rptr. 508, 511 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960).
City of New Orleans v. Kiefer, 164 So. 2d 336, 339 (La. 1964).
Greenblatt, 2 Cal. Rptr. at 511.
City of Miami v. Kayfetz, 92 So. 2d 798, 803 (Fla. 1957).
Leonarz, supra note 49, § 2 (citing United States v. R & J Enters., 178 F. Supp.
1, 4 (D. Alaska 1959)).
55. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 562.131 (West 2018); see also, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. §
04.16.020 (West 2018); CAL. PENAL CODE § 303 (West 2018); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
244.030 (West 2018); LA. STAT. ANN. § 26:286 (2018); TEX. CODE ANN. § 104.01
(West 2018); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 944.36 (West 2018).
56. The I.R.S. considers B-girls to be employees for income tax purposes. Rev.
Rul. 62-157, 1962-2 C.B. 216 (“Where individuals mingle with and encourage customers to buy drinks in night clubs or similar-type establishments for remuneration determined on a commission basis or otherwise (the so-called B-Girls), they are employees
of the operators of the establishments with respect to such services for purposes of the
Federal employment taxes.”).
57. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 562.131(1).
58. Id. § 562.131(2).
59. Id. § 562.131(3).
60. Id. § 775.082(4)(b) (West 2018) (referencing the sixty days imprisonment); Id.
§ 775.083(1)(e) (West 2018) (noting the maximum $500 fine).
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Perhaps even more pertinent to the case at hand, the City of Miami likewise has its own ordinance restricting B-girl activity, which predates the Florida statute.61 The Miami ordinance goes a step further than the Florida statute
and makes it illegal for employees to “mingle or fraternize with customers.”62

B. Wire Fraud
Enacted in 1952, the federal wire fraud statute63 serves as “a jurisdictional
hook” to facilitate federal prosecutorial involvement where it is not otherwise
explicitly authorized.64 Wire fraud generally consists of (1) a scheme to defraud by means of a material deception; (2) where the perpetrator intended to
defraud; (3) while using interstate wires to carry out the scheme; (4) which
resulted in, or would have resulted in, the loss of money or property.65 The
United States Supreme Court has observed on multiple occasions that the statute encompasses “everything designed to defraud by representations as to the
past or present, or suggestions and promises as to the future.”66 Thus, the statute is regularly used as a tool to prosecute general wrongdoing because transactions involving credit cards are transmitted across state lines, thereby constituting a “wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce.”67
Although the wire fraud statute makes criminal “any scheme or artifice to
defraud,” the statute itself does not explain what constitutes such a scheme or

61. Compare B-Girls Fading Attraction in Bars Throughout U.S., supra note 47
(noting that in 1954, Miami enacted an ordinance to restrict B-girl activity), with FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 562.131 (originally enacted as the Professional Service Corporation Act,
ch. 621–234 (1961)).
62. MIAMI, FLA., CODE § 4-4 (2018), https://library.municode.com/fl/miami/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=PTIITHCO_CH4ALBE_ARTIINGE_S44EMNOMICU (“It shall be unlawful for employees or entertainers in places dispensing
alcoholic beverages for consumption on the premises to mingle or fraternize with the
customers or patrons of such establishment.”).
63. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012). The wire fraud statute is modeled after the mail
fraud statute, which has been in existence since the 1872. C.J. Williams, What Is the
Gist of the Mail Fraud Statute?, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 287 (2014). The mail fraud statute
was originally enacted “to address the sale of counterfeit currency through the United
States Mail.” Id. at 291.
64. Id. at 307.
65. Devika Singh et al., Mail and Wire Fraud, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1555, 1557
(2017).
66. Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 377 (2005) (Ginsburg J., dissenting) (quoting Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 313 (1896)).
67. 18 U.S.C. § 1343; Peter R. Ezersky, Intra-Corporate Mail and Wire Fraud:
Criminal Liability for Fiduciary Breach, 94 YALE L.J. 1427, 1428 (1985).
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artifice,68 leaving the phrase “scheme to defraud” to be “judicially defined.”69
Modern courts have defined the phrase broadly, allowing it to encompass deceptive schemes that do not fit the common law definition of fraud.70 In many
courts, including the Eleventh Circuit, a scheme to defraud is measured by a
“reflection of moral uprightness, of fundamental honesty, fair play and right
dealing in the general and business life of members of society.”71 Generally, a
scheme to defraud involves depriving a person of “something of value by trick,
deceit, chicane, or overreaching.”72
Simply put, the flexibility of this language sets the bar for charging wire
fraud extremely low, making the statute a preferred weapon of the government.73 For this reason, the statute has been described as both a “blessing and
[a] curse.”74 On one hand, the wire fraud statute serves “as a first line of defense” or “stopgap device” to address previously unseen forms of criminal conduct that fail to fall within more specific legislation.75 On the other hand, the
statute can be used as a vehicle for prosecuting certain behaviors that, “albeit
offensive to the morals or aesthetics of federal prosecutors, cannot reasonably
be expected by the instigators to form the basis of a federal felony.”76 And
while the Justice Department claims to defer federal prosecution for petty local
fraud, no legal mechanism prevents abuse of this discretion.77
However, despite its breadth, there are limits to the judicially created interpretation of a “scheme to defraud.”78 The statute itself makes the most important limit obvious: The scheme must be one to defraud and cannot be something that, while possibly misleading or even unethical, falls short of outright
fraud.79 Many courts, such as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
68. 18 U.S.C. § 1343. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “artifice” as “a clever plan
or idea, esp. one intended to deceive.” Artifice, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014).
69. United States v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213, 1239 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting
United States v. Pendergraft, 297 F.3d 1198, 1208 (11th Cir. 2002)).
70. Id. at 1240.
71. Id. (quoting Gregory v. United States, 253 F.2d 104, 109 (5th Cir. 1958)).
72. Id. (quoting Pendergraft, 297 F.3d at 1208–09).
73. Charles Clark, “Schemes to Defraud” Under the Federal Mail and Wire Fraud
Statutes: Development of a Working Definition, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 679, 684
(2010).
74. United States v. Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069, 1079 (1st Cir. 1997).
75. Id. (quoting United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405–06 (1974) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting)).
76. Id.
77. Gregory Howard Williams, Good Government by Prosecutorial Decree: The
Use and Abuse of Mail Fraud, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 137, 145–46, 152 (1990) (“U.S. Attorneys or their assistants decide largely on their own what improper practices warrant
federal prosecution” and that “the inquiry is evaluative rather than mechanistic.”).
78. United States v. Takhalov, 827 F.3d 1307, 1312 (11th Cir.), as revised (Oct.
3), modified on denial of reh’g, 838 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States
v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213, 1240 (11th Cir. 2011)).
79. Id.
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distinguish between schemes that merely induce their victims to engage in
transactions that they otherwise would have avoided – which are not violations
of the federal wire fraud statute – and schemes that depend upon a misrepresentation of a fundamental element of the bargain for their completion – which
are violations of the federal wire fraud statute.80 The Second Circuit has also
held that misrepresentations that only amount to deceit are not enough to maintain a federal wire fraud prosecution.81 Instead, the deceit must be paired with
an anticipated harm to the victim that affects “the very nature of the bargain
itself.”82
Thus, to constitute a “scheme to defraud,” as used in the wire fraud statute, a defendant must intend to harm the victim by lying about the nature of the
bargain itself.83 That lie can fit two primary frameworks: “the defendant might
lie about the price (e.g., if he promises that a good costs $10 when it in fact
costs $20)” or the defendant “might lie about the characteristics of the good
(e.g., if he promises that a gemstone is a diamond when it is in fact a cubic
zirconium).”84 In either instance, the defendant has lied about the nature of the
bargain, hence, in both instances the defendant has committed criminal wire
fraud.85 But if the defendant lies about something other than price or quality,
for example, “if he says that he is the long-lost cousin of a prospective buyer –
then he has not lied about the nature of the bargain, has not ‘schemed to defraud,’ and cannot be convicted of wire fraud on the basis of that lie alone.”86
Federal wire fraud charges carry a much stiffer penalty than state statutes
prohibiting B-girls.87 A person convicted of federal wire fraud can be “fined
[up to] $1,000,000 or imprisoned [up to thirty] years, or both.”88 The most
severe sentences are generally reserved for cases in which the fraud involves a
financial institution coupled with other aggravating circumstances.89 How-

80. United States v. Shellef, 507 F.3d 82, 108 (2d Cir. 2007); see also United
States v. Starr, 816 F.2d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 1987).
81. Shellef, 507 F.3d at 108 (quoting Starr, 816 F.2d at 98–99).
82. Starr, 816 F.2d at 98; see also United States v. Regent Office Supply Co., 421
F.2d 1174, 1182 (2d Cir. 1970) (“[W]e conclude that the defendants intended to deceive
their customers but they did not intend to defraud them, because the falsity of their
representations was not shown to be capable of affecting the customer’s understanding
of the bargain . . . .”).
83. Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1313.
84. Id. at 1313–14 (italics omitted).
85. Id. at 1314.
86. Id.
87. Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 562.131(3) (West 2018) (listing statutes imposing
a second-degree misdemeanor with a maximum penalty of sixty days imprisonment
and not more than $500), with 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012) (carrying a maximum term of
thirty years imprisonment and not more than $1,000,000 in fines for a federal wire fraud
conviction under certain circumstances).
88. 18 U.S.C. § 1343.
89. Id.
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ever, due to a large array of enhancements available under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the average conviction carries with it a sentence in excess of
two years in a federal penitentiary.90 And because each wire transmission constitutes a separate act of wire fraud,91 the penalties can add up quickly, especially when combined with similar charges, such as conspiracy to commit wire
fraud or money laundering, as in the case at hand.92

C. Abuse of Judicial Discretion
As is the case with any conviction, the hurdle for overturning a jury verdict based on abuse of judicial discretion is a difficult one to clear.93 To show
an abuse of discretion for refusal to give a proposed jury instruction in the
Eleventh Circuit, “a defendant must first show that the requested instruction
was a correct statement of the law.”94 Further, he or she must also show “that
the instruction dealt with a sufficiently important point raised during trial” that
was important enough that failure to give the proposed instruction might have
critically interfered with the defendant’s ability to conduct his or her defense.95
Finally, even if a proposed instruction was a correct statement of law, which
dealt with a sufficiently important point that was raised during trial, a conviction must stand unless the defendant can “show that the proposed instruction
‘was not substantially covered by a charge actually given.’”96

90. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES
FISCAL YEAR 2017 11 (June 2018), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publications/2018/FY17_Overview_Federal_Criminal_Cases.pdf (stating the average sentence imposed in all fraud cases in fiscal year 2017 at twenty-six months imprisonment); U.S. SENTENCING; U.S. DEP’T JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. SPECIAL REPORT,
FEDERAL OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS: WHITE COLLAR CRIME 7 (Sept. 1987),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/whc_1985.pdf (reporting the average sentence
length specific to wire fraud convictions in 1985 to be thirty-three months imprisonment); Singh et al., supra note 65, at 1574–75.
91. Singh et al., supra note 65, at 1557 n.16 (alteration in original) (citing United
States v. Jefferson, 674 F.3d 332, 367 (4th Cir. 2012)) (“[I]t is settled that each mailing
or wire transmission in furtherance of the fraud scheme constitutes a separate offense .
. . .”).
92. See, e.g., United States v. Takhalov, 827 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir.), as revised (Oct.
3), modified on denial of reh’g, 838 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir. 2016). (“Following closing
arguments, the jury convicted the defendants on several counts, including multiple
counts of wire fraud and money laundering.”).
93. See Martha S. Davis, Standards of Review: Judicial Review of Discretionary
Decisionmaking, 2 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 47, 54 (2000) (examining the difficulty of
finding “abuse of discretion” because of the deference granted to lower courts).
94. Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1312 (citing United States v. Eckhardt, 466 F.3d 938,
947–48 11th Cir. 2006)).
95. Id. at 1316 (citing Eckhardt, 466 F.3d at 947–48).
96. Id. at 1316 (quoting Eckhardt, 466 F.3d at 947–48).
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IV. INSTANT DECISION
Judge Amul R. Thapar97 wrote for the Eleventh Circuit’s three-judge
panel, stating that the federal wire fraud statute “does not enact as federal law
the Ninth Commandant given to Moses on Sinai” (“Thou shalt not bear false
witness against thy neighbor.”).98 Federal law “forbids only schemes to defraud, not schemes to do other wicked things, e.g., schemes to lie, trick, or
otherwise deceive.”99 The difference, according to Judge Thapar, is that “deceiving does not always involve harming another person; defrauding does.”100
The court carefully distinguished schemes to deceive from schemes to defraud,
noting that Black’s Law Dictionary “defines the word ‘defraud’ as ‘[t]o cause
injury or loss to (a person or organization) by deceit’” and defines the word
“‘deception’ as ‘[t]he act of deliberately causing someone to believe that something is true when the actor knows it to be false.’”101 Thus, the court surmised,
“deceiving is a necessary condition of defrauding but not a sufficient one. Put
another way, one who defrauds always deceives, but one can deceive without
defrauding.”102
With this in mind, the court reasoned that “to defraud, one must intend to
use deception to cause some injury; however, one can deceive without intending to harm at all.”103 Thus, in the court’s view, “deceiving does not always
involve harming another person; defrauding does.”104 Therefore, according to
the court, in addition to deception, the government had to show that the deception caused an injury in order to satisfy the definition of actionable fraud.105 In
applying this rule, Judge Thapar used an analogy of a more common scenario:

97. Judge Thapar, sitting by designation, was visiting from the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Kentucky. Id. at 1309 n.*. Judge Thapar is known for being
by the book; for example, he once sentenced an eighty-four-year-old nun to prison. See
United States v. Walli, 976 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1001, 1006–07 (E.D. Tenn. 2013); Duane
W. Gang, Nun Sentenced to 35 Months in Nuclear Plant Break-in, USA TODAY (Feb.
18, 2014, 11:13 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/02/18/nunnuke-protest-sentencing/5577947/. Subsequent to the decision in United States v. Takhalov, Judge Thapar was nominated and confirmed for a seat on the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, receiving his commission on May 25, 2017. Amul
Thapar, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Amul_Thapar (last visited Aug. 26,
2018).
98. Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1310 n.1.
99. Id. (italics omitted).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1312 (alterations in original) (quoting Defraud, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); Deception, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1310.
105. Id. at 1312.
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[A] young woman asks a rich businessman to buy her a drink at Bob’s
Bar. The businessman buys the drink, and afterwards the young woman
decides to leave. Did the man get what he bargained for? Yes. He
received his drink, and he had the opportunity to buy a young woman a
drink. Does it change things if the woman is Bob’s sister and he paid
her to recruit customers? No; regardless of Bob’s relationship with the
woman, the businessman got exactly what he bargained for. If, on the
other hand, Bob promised to pour the man a glass of Pappy Van Winkle
but gave him a slug of Old Crow instead, well, that would be fraud.
Why? Because the misrepresentation goes to the value of the bargain.106

Here, the court noted that there was little doubt of the Defendants’ intent
to deceive; they even admitted as much during trial.107 Further, when the facts
are viewed as a whole – everything from the Defendants’ arrangements with
the B-girls, to the girls locating unsuspecting men at area hotels, to luring the
men to the Defendants’ clubs and running up bar tabs – an argument could be
made that there was intent to defraud.108 However, the court pointed out that,
in order to sustain a wire fraud conviction, the scheme to defraud must have
involved misrepresentations that go to the nature of the bargain underlying the
transaction.109 Even if the Defendants lied, and even if the victims made purchases based on those lies, “a wire fraud case must end in an acquittal if the
jury nevertheless believes that the alleged victims ‘received exactly what they
paid for.’”110 In this case, since the Defendants’ misrepresentations regarded
their arrangement with the B-girls, and those misrepresentations did not extend
to either the price or quality of the goods sold to the victims, the court held the
Defendants had merely deceived and not defrauded.111
However, lack of fraud alone on the part of the Defendants was not
enough to overturn a jury verdict; instead, there needed to be a more significant
error in the trial itself.112 While the Defendants’ appeal was grounded in a
claim of failure to allow a proper jury instruction, and in this case that instruction was never given, that failure could only rise to abuse of judicial discretion
if it was a correct statement of the law that dealt with a sufficiently important
106. Id. at 1313 (footnotes omitted). Judge Thapar supplied two footnotes to explain that Pappy Van Winkle or “‘Pappy’s’ as it is often called, is a particularly rare
bourbon varietal: nearly impossible to find, and nearly impossible to afford when one
finds it.” Old Crow, on the other hand, despite having “a venerable pedigree – reportedly the go-to drink of Mark Twain, Ulysses S. Grant, Hunter Thompson, and Henry
Clay – is not Kentucky’s most-expensive liquor. Its ‘deluxe’ version, ‘Old Crow Reserve,’ retails for approximately $15 per bottle.” Id. at 1313 n.5–6.
107. Id. at 1310.
108. See id.
109. Id. at 1313–14.
110. Id. (quoting United States v. Shellef, 507 F.3d 82, 108 (2d Cir. 2007)).
111. Id. at 1313–14.
112. See, e.g., id. at 1316–17 (finding the government did not prove the error was
harmless).
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point raised during trial that “was not substantially covered by a charge actually
given” to the jury.113
The court acknowledged that the requested instruction, which was denied
by the trial court, seemed to be a correct statement of the law because “‘failure
to disclose the financial arrangement between the B-girls and the Bar’ was not
‘in and of itself’ sufficient to convict the defendants of wire fraud.”114 Additionally, the court concluded that the denied instruction was certainly important
enough that failure to give it might have critically interfered with the Defendants’ ability to put forth their defense.115 After all, Judge Thapar explained,
“[I]f the jurors believed that they could convict based only on the B-girls’ failure ‘to disclose the financial arrangement between the B-girls and the Bar,’
then the defense’s theory would have collapsed entirely.”116
However, even though the denied instruction was accurate and material,
the court held that such instruction must not have been substantially covered
by a similar instruction before an abuse of discretion could be found.117 The
court explained that whether a given instruction substantially covered a requested one depended on “the size of the logical leap that a juror would need
to make to get from the instruction the court gave to the instruction the defendant requested.”118 Here, to get from the given instruction119 to the requested
one,120 the inference “that a person is not ‘deceived or cheated out of money or
property’ if he gets exactly what he paid for even though he is deceived into
paying in the first place” required too great of a logical leap.121 After all, Judge
Thapar observed, “[T]he average juror is not Mr. Spock:”122 he or she needs to
be specifically instructed by the judge on the legal issues.123
113. Id. at 1316 (quoting United States v. Eckhardt, 466 F.3d 938, 948 (11th Cir.

2006)).
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 1314–15.
Id. at 1316 (quoting Eckhardt, 466 F.3d at 947–48).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1318.
The trial court instructed the jurors “that the defendants were guilty of wire
fraud only if they intended to ‘deceive or cheat someone out of money or property.’”
Id.
120. That “[f]ailure to disclose the financial arrangement between the B-girls and
the Bar, in and of itself, is not sufficient to convict a defendant of any offense.” Id. at
1317.
121. Id. at 1318.
122. Mr. Spock is a fictional character in the Star Trek franchise who, as a member
of the “Vulcan” species, thinks in a very mechanical, highly logical manner. Mark
Hensch, Obama Explains ‘Spock-like’ Impression: It Was Hard Acting ‘Cheerful’ in
2009, THE HILL (Jan. 19, 2017, 8:36 AM), http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/315021-obama-it-was-hard-acting-cheerful-in-2009.
123. See Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1318. Judge Thapar jokingly noted, “As it stands,
however, the vast majority of American juries are composed exclusively of humans.
And humans, unlike Vulcans, sometimes need a bit more guidance as to exactly what
the court’s instructions logically entail.” Id.
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Thus, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court had, in fact, abused
its discretion by not allowing the proposed jury instruction requested by the
Defendants.124 Judge Thapar acknowledged that the district court had presided
over a long and complex criminal trial and that the district court’s evidentiary
and other legal rulings were nearly flawless.125 Nevertheless, “the district court
refused to give a jury instruction that was a correct statement of the law, was
critical to the defense’s case theory, and was not substantially covered by other
instructions.”126 Thus, the wire fraud convictions could not stand and, absent
wire fraud, the conspiracy and money laundering convictions also could not
stand.127 In the end, with the exception of a visa violation, all of the Defendants’ convictions were overturned.128

V. COMMENT
Considering how important the offense of fraud is to white-collar crime
and considering that white-collar crime has been in existence for decades, one
might expect the definition of fraud to be clear by now. However, United
States v. Takhalov highlights the ongoing uncertainty about what constitutes
criminal fraud. Most common white-collar offenses include “fraud” in their
title: mail fraud, wire fraud, credit card fraud, health care fraud, computer
fraud, securities fraud, bank fraud, tax fraud, and so on.129
Because “fraud is infinite in variety,”130 courts struggle in attempting to
define it.131 But, of course, a proper definition is needed because human ingenuity also concocts many schemes that may be deceptive at their core but are
technically not criminal. Criminal law requires the drawing of lines between
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 1319.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1323–25.
Id. at 1325. In its original holding, the Eleventh Circuit reversed all of the
wire fraud convictions except for one, which was allowed to stand because of a lie that
the Defendants told to American Express. See United States v. Takhalov, 838 F.3d
1168, 1169 (11th Cir. 2016). However, the court held a rehearing three months later
regarding the remaining wire fraud conviction. Id. Upon review, it was determined
that the lie had not “furthered a fraud scheme” and it did not amount to “fraud after the
fact.” Id. at 1169–70. Thus, the final wire fraud conviction was also overturned, and
the original holding was modified. Id. at 1170.
129. See 15 U.S.C. § 1644 (2012) (credit card fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 911 (2012) (citizenship fraud); id. §§ 1028, 1028A (identity theft fraud); id. § 1030 (computer fraud);
id. § 1341 (mail fraud); id. § 1343 (wire fraud); id. § 1344 (bank fraud); id. § 1347
(2012) (health care fraud); id. § 1348 (securities fraud); 26 U.S.C. §§ 7202–04 (2012)
(tax fraud).
130. Reddaway v. Banham [1896] 74 LT 289 (HL) at 297.
131. See, e.g., Allcard v. Skinner [1887] 57 L. Times 61 (Ct. of App.) [73] (“[N]o
court has ever attempted to define fraud.”); Foshay v. United States, 68 F.2d 205, 211
(8th Cir. 1933) (“To try to delimit ‘fraud’ by definition would tend to reward subtle and
ingenious circumvention and is not done.”).
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conduct that actually amounts to fraud and conduct that is merely dishonest or
unethical – and sometimes those lines can be quite blurry. As the great Justice
Holmes once pondered, “[H]ow strong an infusion of fraud is necessary to turn
a flavor into a poison”?132
For better or worse, and in spite of the men who were taken for their
money, Judge Thapar and the Eleventh Circuit got the ruling in Takhalov correct.133 The court’s duty is to merely interpret the law, not create it.134 Although the Defendants’ actions were despicable, dishonest, misleading, and, as
the court pointed out, deceitful, they were nonetheless legitimate business
transactions. To hold otherwise – to find that a business transaction in which
a customer orders an item, receives it, and is subsequently charged exactly what
he or she agreed to pay as being improper – would be concerning. To take that
a step further and find that such a transaction rose to the level of actionable
fraud could threaten to crack the foundation of at least one constitutional
amendment.135
Setting a precedent that deceit constitutes fraud would broaden the gray
area between what is legal and what is criminal, and no doubt open the law to
the proverbial slippery slope.136 Imagine a scenario in which a lottery advertises a multi-million-dollar jackpot and an uneducated, unsuspecting young
adult buys a ticket in hopes of hitting it big. Should the lottery organizers be
held responsible when the ticket purchaser feels defrauded after realizing that
his or her chances of hitting the jackpot are minuscule? In this scenario, as
well as the case at hand, the plan organizers profited from the “scheme.” Further, in both instances, it is clear that the organizers used deception to their
advantage. However, few would argue that the organizers of the lottery deserve significant time in jail as a result of their transgression. After all, the
ticket purchaser knew what he or she was getting and got what he or she paid
for.137 Likewise, in the case at hand, sentencing the Defendants to a term of
imprisonment for exploiting deception would be unjust.
132. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 247 (1918) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
133. See generally United States v. Takhalov, 827 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir.), as revised
(Oct. 3), modified on denial of reh’g, 838 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir. 2016).
134. Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 290 (2008) (quoting Am. Trucking
Ass’ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 201 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring)) (“[O]ur normal
role is to interpret law created by others and ‘not to prescribe what it shall be.’”).
135. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (“The general right to
make a contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the 14th Amendment of the Federal Constitution.”), overruled in part by DayBrite Lighting Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952), and Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S.
726 (1963), and abrogated by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
136. A slippery slope is “[a] limited step that if taken now, in the view of one who
warns against it, will inevitably lead to further, objectionable steps later.” Slippery
slope, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
137. For the very small price of a few dollars, he or she purchased an opportunity
for lifelong financial security.
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No, what the Defendants did was not illegal. Somewhere between low
moral standards and a penchant for profit lies a nexus in which objectionable
business practices can thrive. The Defendants found precisely that sweet spot.
By combining booze with beautiful women, they willfully impaired the decision-making abilities of their customers and then capitalized on precisely that
impairment. In effect, they did little more than take advantage of a legal loophole.138
While not illegal, there can be no doubt that the Defendants knew what
they were doing was “wrong.”139 Most would agree that there should have
been at least some consequences to their suspect behavior, lest the public need
be wary of this scam or similar scams popping up again not only in Miami, but
in any tourist destination across the country flush with enough wealth to make
the scheme practicable. After all, the plan would have worked. Absent legal
fees, the Defendants would have been $1,300,000 richer.140
In the case at hand, however, not only should there have been consequences, but if the prosecution would have charged the Defendants with violating Florida’s B-girl statute,141 which prohibits employees of a bar from soliciting customers to purchase drinks for them, rather than with wire fraud,142
the Defendants would have been certain to suffer those consequences. Since
the statute’s enactment by the Florida General Assembly in 1961, several convictions arising from it have been upheld by various appellate courts involving
circumstances that were far less objectionable than the scheme being operated
by the Defendants.143 But instead, the Defendants were never charged with
violating the B-girl statute.144
Due to the unique circumstances surrounding this case, the Defendants’
trial, conviction, and appeal were widely covered by both local and national

138. Florida law already precludes a finding of civil injury where a person’s own
drunkenness is the principal cause of the occurrence of the injury. See FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 768.36(2) (West 2018). Although this applies to civil liability and not criminal, the
reasoning underlying the statute would apply to either.
139. The Defendants even admitted as much at trial as part of their defense strategy.
United States v. Takhalov, 827 F.3d 1307, 1310, 1317 (11th Cir.), as revised (Oct. 3),
modified on denial of reh’g, 838 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir. 2016).
140. See Brief for the United States, supra note 2, at 79.
141. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 562.131 (West 2018).
142. Granted, charging the Defendants under the Florida B-girl statute would have
required the case to be brought in state court rather than federal court.
143. See Shevin v. Bocaccio, Inc., 379 So. 2d 105, 106 (Fla. 1979) (constitutional);
De Joris v. Lee, 151 So. 2d 830, 832 (Fla. 1963) (within the legislature’s police power);
215-22nd St., Inc. v. Bd. of Bus. Regulation, Div. of Beverage, 330 So. 2d 821, 822
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (establishing elements); Torch Club, Inc. v. Keating, 174 So.
2d 746, 746–47 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (license revocation for violation).
144. See United States v. Pavlenko, No. 11-20279-CR, 2012 WL 222928, at *3
(S.D. Fla. Jan. 25, 2012) (“[T]he jury will hear that a Florida criminal statute had been
violated, even though nobody involved in this case was ever arrested for or charged
with violating that statute.”).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018

17

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 8

770

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

media.145 Throughout the coverage, one theme became common between legal
commentators and legal bloggers alike – why was this case being tried in federal court instead of state court?146 To borrow the words of Judge Thapar, it
hardly requires “Holmesian feats of deduction”147 to infer why the state backed
off of what should have been an open and shut case in favor of allowing the
federal government to bring a case in which the facts were not in their favor.148
One possible explanation exists – greed.
The Defendants’ greed in this case cannot be denied; they all but admitted
it as the lynchpin of their defense strategy.149 In fact, their devious white-collar
scheme quite literally spawned an episode of the popular CNBC TV series,
American Greed.150 But it is the prosecutorial greed here that should not be
overlooked. If the government had brought its case under the Florida B-girl
statute,151 it is likely that it would have won. Albeit such a conviction would
have come at considerably lower stakes than the twelve years that the Defendants’ were initially convicted of, since the Florida B-girl statute carries a maximum of sixty days imprisonment and a $500 fine.152

145. See, e.g., Weaver, supra note 14 (covering the trial); Jay Weaver, Appeals
Court Throws Out Miami Beach ‘Bar-Girl’ Convictions, MIAMI HERALD (July 11,
2016, 7:41 PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/miami-beach/article88982837.html (covering the appeal).
146. See, e.g., David Markus, Hot Girls Getting Guys Drunk on South Beach is Now
a Federal Crime?, S. DIST. OF FLA. BLOG (Nov. 5, 2012, 9:19 AM), http://sdfla.blogspot.com/2012/11/hot-girls-getting-guys-drunk-on-south.html (“Clearly if this happened, it’s criminal. But even if that happened, is it a federal offense? Why isn’t this
a classic state court crime?”).
147. “Sherlock or Oliver Wendell: either Holmes will do here.” United States v.
Takhalov, 827 F.3d 1307, 1318 n.9 (11th Cir.), as revised (Oct. 3), modified on denial
of reh’g, 838 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir. 2016).
148. The Florida B-girl statute expressly prohibits any holder of a liquor license “to
knowingly permit any person to loiter in or about the licensed premises for the purpose
of begging or soliciting any patron or customer . . . to purchase any beverage,” and
there can be little doubt that is exactly what the Defendants did, since they, in fact, hired
the women to lure guys to their clubs to purchase drinks. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 562.131(2)
(West 2018); Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1307.
149. See id. at 1311.
150. American Greed: The Bar Girls Trap (CNBC television broadcast May 19,
2016), https://www.cnbc.com/video/2016/05/12/the-bar-girls-trap-.html (Episode Preview Description: “Beautiful women with looks that kill are controlled by Russian
gangsters to seduce amorous men in nightclubs out of their money. It’s a super expensive hangover.”).
151. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 562.131 (West 2018) makes it illegal for a liquor license to
“knowingly permit any person to loiter in or about the licensed premises for the purpose
of begging or soliciting any patron or customer of, or visitor in, such premises to purchase any beverage, alcoholic or otherwise.” There can be little doubt that the Defendants’ plan directly violated the statue.
152. See id. § 562.131(3); see id. § 775.082(4)(b) (West 2018); id. § 775.083(1)(e)
(West 2018).
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Regardless, the states in general, including Florida, need to create alternative avenues that provide harsher penalties for perpetrators who go beyond
merely hiring employees for the purpose of “begging or soliciting” customers
to purchase drinks and instead go so far as to intentionally deceive people out
of millions of dollars.153 The law currently prohibits girls from entertaining
guys at a bar, but perhaps there should be a separate penalty for girls that entice
them to be there in the first place.154
State and local governments clearly need other means of pursuing these
types of cases as well as statutes that carry more severe penalties. In the absence of harsher penalties or new statutes designed to curb these types of
schemes, it is not unreasonable to suspect that similar schemes will continue.
After all, the possibility of weighing a $500 penalty against a multi-milliondollar upside simply makes these types of “business ventures” too easy to set
up and too lucrative to pass up.

VI. CONCLUSION
Lord Macnaghten famously quipped over a century ago that “fraud is infinite in variety.”155 This holds true in today’s digital age, where schemes to
make a quick buck at the expense of others are seemingly ubiquitous.156 In
United States v. Takhalov,157 the Eleventh Circuit addressed precisely one such
scheme, and, in doing so, added some much-needed refining to the judiciallycrafted definition of fraud. Ultimately, while the Defendants’ scheme to use
alcohol and women to seduce profits out of unsuspecting tourists was misleading and deceitful, the Defendants’ dose of fraud was not “strong enough here
to need a remedy from the law.”158
153. See id. § 562.131(2).
154. This Note, along with the case at hand, both generally refer to females as the

ones soliciting the purchase of drinks, males as the ones being solicited, and universally
makes use of the term “B-girls.” However, as modern views have become more sophisticated, such terms are increasingly being viewed as sexist. As a result, some jurisdictions have modified their laws to use a more politically correct phrase, such as “B
drinkers.” E.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 26:286 (2018) (making it illegal to “[e]mploy or permit persons, commonly known as B drinkers, to solicit patrons for drinks . . . .”) (emphasis added); see also Adriane Quinlan, In Kenner, B-drinkers Will Still Be Illegal,
But Don’t Call Them Girls, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Mar. 18, 2014),
https://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/03/in_kenner_b-drinkers_will_stil.html.
155. Reddaway v. Banham [1896] 74 LT 289 (HL) at 297.
156. Common examples of such schemes include, among others, email scams,
phishing scams, and identify theft.
157. See generally 827 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir.), as revised (Oct. 3), modified on denial
of reh’g, 838 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir. 2016).
158. In response to his statement about how strong an infusion of fraud is necessary
to turn a flavor into a poison, Justice Holmes asserted in International News Service v.
Associated Press, “the dose seems to me strong enough here to need a remedy from the
law.” 248 U.S. 215, 247–48 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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